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In this light, it seems remarkable that the populist cabinet collapsed within two months with hardly any elements of the local population coming to its defense. As was to occur in virtually all anti-Bolshevik coalitions in 1918, the socialists were succeeded first by liberal and conservative "nonparty activists" and later by a military dictator. 3 Historians have yet to explain why such enterprises failed in the North and elsewhere. Western studies of the Civil War tend to portray the moderate socialists as a "democratic alternative" to Bolshevism that commanded the loyalty of a majority of the people, particularly peasants, but fell victim to the intrigue of liberal and conservative politicians, the military might of the Russian officers, and ultimately the ruthlessness of the Bolsheviks.4 Only parts of this assessment are accurate. The SR Party was popular. It had the largest faction in the Constituent Assembly, and during the spring of 1918 joined with Mensheviks to challenge the Bolsheviks successfully in numerous elections to soviets outside Moscow and Petrograd, including Arkhangel'sk.5 Widespread popular sympathy, however, is not synonymous with a loyal following. To explain the fortunes of the populists during the Civil War, we must determine what it meant to have a majority of votes in conditions of Civil War, and whether popularity could be used to acquire real power.
It is also true that the populists, unlike the Bolsheviks, traditionally looked to the "toiling people" as a whole, rather than only workers and soldiers, for the foundation of their parties. This set them apart as well from their partners in the anti-Bolshevik coalitions who had ceased to be concerned with garnering popular support (liberal and conservative politicians) or had never been concerned with popularity (the vast majority of the officers).6 Yet my research on the North suggests that from 1917 to mid-1918 these populist leaders abandoned, at least temporarily, their commitment to popular and elected government. Large segments of the rank and file of their parties continued to aspire to popular regimes, but this was a source of division within the parties, not a mitigating factor.
A related question is the specific character of the regions in which the antiBolshevik coalitions functioned. Even if the populist leaders considered the strug-gle an "All-Russian" cause, their success depended on the responses they evoked in the localities that they occupied. Arkhangel'sk was not a "typical" province, relative to the "norms" derived from our understanding of central Russia, and the experience of populists in the North may not reflect the responses that they elicited in other regions of the Russian Empire. Indeed, anti-Bolshevik forces concentrated in regions that were in some way "atypical." Like the Baltic region, the Volga provinces, South Russia, Western Siberia, or the Far East, the North had a particular set of historical experiences and social, economic, and environmental specificities-in short, a regional identity-that any aspiring leader had to reckon with.
There is a tendency in the existing historiography of the Civil War in the peripheries to dismiss the local setting as an unfortunate peculiarity, and focus instead on interparty politics and military events.7 The peculiarity of the North was its sparse population base, which made it exceedingly difficult to form and supply a large Russian force to fight the Red Army.8 Notwithstanding these obstacles, the socialist leaders tried urgently to mobilize the local population, small though it was, and herein lay the most revealing aspect of the history of the socialist regime: its failure was related intimately to its inability to address local issues. I approach these two sets of questions-regional identity and the relationship between support and power-by focusing on two processes that culminated in the summer and autumn of 1918. The first is the development of the North, including the legacy inherited from the Imperial period, four years of war and revolution, and a succession of three regimes. The second is the evolving outlook of the populist leaders who sought to overthrow the Bolsheviks after the coup d'etat of October 1917, beginning with the European North. In essence, I find two separate processes that briefly intersected in the summer of 1918 to bring down the Bolsheviks but never really merged in such a way as to create a lasting movement. chants involved in foreign trade who were aware that in any Western society they would have occupied a prominent place in government and local administration; in prerevolutionary Russia, they were simply non-nobles. 10 The local elite's consciousness of its inferior position spawned two major grievances. The first was that the central government's economic policies ignored their interests. The Arkhangel'sk merchant elite believed it was in economic decline, and expected the Russian government to arrest the process; instead, the government invited foreigners to operate timber and trading concessions along the Arctic and White Sea Coasts.11 A byproduct of the merchants' perception was xenophobia, notwithstanding the fact that many of them depended on their foreign business operations, traced their lineage and names to Germany, Holland, and Britain, and continued to intermarry extensively with foreign merchant families.12 Secondly, the merchant leaders faulted the government for its inability to recognize the specific needs of the region on which they depended for their livelihood. Local intelligenty shared this view. To them, the North was heir to the Novgorodian tradition of "political and religious freedom" because it had been spared the "retarding" influence of Mongol invasion and occupation, had never known serfdom, and was free from the corrupting influences of autocratic, bureaucratic, and nobiliary Russia. They argued that the nobiliary bureaucracy had imposed authoritarianism and arbitrariness upon Northerners, who otherwise were self-reliant, independent, egalitarian, and uniquely prepared for participation in government,13 Merchants and intelligenty demanded greater control over local affairs through the establishment of zemstvos elected by a broad suffrage, but the State Council repeatedly rejected these petitions on the grounds that the social structure of the province (the absence of a landed nobility) would yield "overly democratic" institutions.14 The specific position of local educated society produced resentment and suspicion of central authority that lasted into the revolutionary period.
Other strata of the local population were also conscious of the North's specificity. Peasants lived in small and widely dispersed settlements that were isolated from each other during the long winters. The government had little role to play in rural affairs: the land reforms of the 1860s and 1907 were never implemented in the The perception of a foreign danger was also prominent in local folklore. Tales The members of the Soiuz agreed from the start that the socialists would dominate the new regime, since they had won majorities in all elections since February 1917 and were deemed the most capable of bringing workers and peasants into the anti-Bolshevik coalition. The Soiuz and the Allies approached members of an underground officers' group in Petrograd to undertake the military aspects of the plot and appointed Georgii Chaplin, a naval captain, to coordinate it. 51 The coup was carried out smoothly on the night of 2 August. As expected, few locals rose to the defense of the Bolsheviks, and many key Soviet officials gave intelligence and direct aid to Chaplin. Even the Arctic sailors failed to defend the Bolsheviks, partly because their commanders were cooperating with the opposi- The immediate task of the new regime was to create a Russian national army. It would first remove Bolshevik power from the remainder of Russia, after which "we will stand face to face with our real and chief enemy, the Germans."54 But by the end of September, no more than seventy locals had answered the call for volunteers. The government decided on partial mobilization, but the apparent apathy of the local population to the imperatives of war was a cause for great concern among socialists. Their anxieties were reflected on the pages of the socialist daily, Vozrozhdenie Severa, in which the lead articles were often written by the cabinet members themselves.55 "What a happy hour!" declared a lead article soon after conscription was announced; this was the only way for "a great nation" to achieve "respect and recognition . . . The government did what was required by the pressing interests of the state, its honor, and its dignity," and will "allow citizens to fulfill their duty to their motherland." "It only remains to be hoped," the author continued, that the decree will "bring the population out of the apathy" that had permitted the Bolsheviks to seize power in the first place.56 Another article blamed the "darkness of the masses" (temnota naroda) and its "slavelike fear" (rabskaia boiazn') for the decline of Russia; "rodina" was a distant concept for most of the narod, but they must be educated to understand that "military might" was essential for the "national honor" and the reestablishment of "state wholeness." The "education" of the narod, the author concluded, would flow from the "regenerating spirit" of "educated society. their "apathy" and "darkness," but a different picture emerges from the regular column in the same newspaper entitled "From the Countryside." This section included the minutes and resolutions of district and volost' congresses, citizens' assemblies, soviets, and village skhody. They all expressed loyalty to the Supreme Administration and its goals, acceptance of the need for a Russian army, but almost uniform opposition to conscription. At one peasant meeting the delegates adopted the language of the socialist leaders but used it to arrive at a different conclusion. "The masses" were indeed "dark," they agreed, and had been "demoralized by the International [sic], which destroys love of country," but they concluded that a conscripted army formed of this apathetic mass would produce apathetic soldiers and must be avoided.58 Another assembly not only rejected conscription but also demanded "the cessation of Civil War, which has disrupted the whole supply system."59 These declarations suggest that what the socialists termed "apathy," "darkness" and "crudeness" among the masses were euphemisms for conflict of interests. There is little doubt that the peasants sympathized with the populist parties, but they did so on their own, clearly defined terms. They expressed no interest in gosudarstvennost', legality, and national honor as understood in the provincial capital, and they certainly had no desire to pursue the war against Germany and Bolshevism. Far from being apathetic, peasants used meetings to discuss the administration's policies, but they were either indifferent to the goals defined by the populist leaders, or opposed categorically the means needed to achieve them. After all, it was the peasants themselves who would do the fighting.
The issue of local self-government highlighted similar tensions between the socialist politicians and the people they claimed to represent. On the day that the Supreme Administration came into existence, it ordered the disbandment of soviets at every level of administration. The soviets, according to the cabinet, were organs which by their class exclusiveness isolated workers and peasants from the salutary influence of "society" and lent themselves to the demagogy and subversion of extremists. The "legitimate" organs were the zemstvos and municipal dumas, which were forums for "above-class" cooperation. They were also less of a break with tradition, since they had existed in Imperial Russia, and following the February Revolution were elected by a broad suffrage.60
Pointing out that the soviets had been abused and usurped by the Bolsheviks was one thing, but banning them was quite another. Part of the problem was the strong connection, in the minds of the populist leaders, between Bolshevism and soviets. To be sure, the boundaries between the two were rapidly disappearing on Soviet territory. However, at the very time that the Administration was dismantling soviet institutions, peasant assemblies were informing it of the reestablishment of their local soviets-free of Bolshevik coercion-along with assemblies, congresses, and skhody. Apparently, peasants felt little need to distinguish between these different labels; they simply indicated a preference for their own grass-roots organizations. For example, the Onega District Congress of Peasants met in mid-August and established the District People's Soviet, while a neighboring volost' meeting declared that it stood for "popular meetings and assemblies" as the preferred form of government.61
Not surprisingly, there is no mention of peasants reestablishing zemstvos. Zemstvos had been established in Arkhangel'sk for the first time in the summer of 1917. Even local socialists complained that the zemstvos lacked money, authority, and, indeed, a purpose.62 The most pressing problem of the time was food supply, and in this domain the cooperatives were already in control.63 The populist leaders were abolishing the existing institutions of local government without providing an alternative that could link them with the local population.
The categorical abolition of soviets without regard to local conditions had serious consequences for the relations between the Administration and the Murman Soviet. This was the soviet that had invited the Allies to land in the North-the first Allied landing in the Civil War-and it was this landing that of legality.91 Donald Raleigh reached similar conclusions in the local setting of Saratov province in 1917, contending that the leaders of the moderate socialist parties abandoned their own revolutionary programs in the pursuit of compromise, legality, and the interests of the Russian state, while their constituents became increasingly radicalized.92 Ziva Galili argues convincingly that these developments were not limited to the populist parties: Menshevik party leaders in 1917 used complex and abstract analyses to understand a crisis that was immediate and material, with the result that they became thoroughly alienated from those who had originally elected them.93
These treatments of the main socialist parties in 1917 highlight a broad contradiction in the thinking of their leaders: they faced a choice between convincing broad segments of the population of the need for moderation, foresight, and sacrifice in times of extreme crisis (which they were unable to do), and leading these social groups by supporting programs radically different from their own (which they were unwilling to do). As socialists they were determined to redress the Russian social divide, but offered abstract diagnoses and legalistic prescriptions that seemed to circumvent the demands of their constituents. In later months socialist leaders were perplexed by the passivity of the people in the face of events that they considered to be turning points in the Revolution: the Bolshevik coup, the disbandment of the Constituent Assembly, and the surrender of vast territories to the Central Powers without resistance.
The contradiction was only accentuated in the autumn of 1918. Socialist leaders arrived in the North convinced that the "popular masses" were easily deceived by propaganda and incapable of understanding the broader interests of Russian statehood, and they offered policies that were statist, centrist, and irrelevant to local conditions. Every failure to rally support for their policies reinforced their conviction that the narod was "dark" and "crude"-words that permeate the writings of populists in this period. By October 1918 socialist leaders were disenchanted with the electoral process and keenly aware that electoral majorities did not ensure that they could mobilize support for specific measures. The result was an estrangement from the local population, and the lack of a popular base and institutionalized links created a dependence on foreign troops in a region with a long history of foreign war and xenophobia.
These conclusions apply to the socialist leaders in the North, but research on other regions in the same period may reveal similar developments. The same organization that plotted the coup in Arkhangel'sk, the Soiuz vozrozhdeniia Rossii, 
